Trial Court Abused Its Discretion and Failed to Comply With New Bail Law
In 2017, after Mr. Guerra was arrested and charged with multiple counts, the trial court set bail at $50,000 in cash or a $75,000 bond. Unable to post bail, he was remanded to custody and ultimately convicted and sentenced to prison. On direct appeal, his conviction was reversed by the Appellate Division in 2024, and a new trial was ordered. A dissenting justice granted leave to the Court of Appeals, which is still pending.
New trial counsel subsequently made a bail application to the trial court, pursuant to the new 2019 bail laws that had been enacted under Criminal Procedure Law § 510.10. Counsel argued that Mr. Guerra was not a flight risk and sought either release on his own recognizance, supervised release, or electronic monitoring, while the prosecution sought remand until the direct appeal was resolved. Without any elaboration, the trial court ruled that it had “considered all the factors outlined in section 510.30 in the CPL” and found “the least restrictive means of assuring [Mr. Guerra’s] return to court” was “continued remand.” Appellate Advocates filed a habeas petition in the Appellate Division, arguing that the trial court’s remand order violated § 510.10, and the Appellate Division dismissed the writ, finding the remand order did not violate constitutional or statutory standards. After a motion to reargue was denied, the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.
The Court ruled that the trial court’s remand order failed to comply with § 510.10. Under that revised statute, the court is required to make an individualized flight-risk determination and explain the basis for that determination and its choice of securing order. But in this case, the trial court “provided no reasoning for its choice to remand,” did not “state on the record” that Mr. Guerra posed a flight risk, and failed to explain the basis for its determination. In addition, the trial court’s brief statement that it “considered” the factors in “section 510.30” referred to the wrong statutory section; did not indicate what factors it relied upon; and failed to identify a rationale for remand. Because the statute requires a court to “explain” its reasoning, and the trial court failed to do so, it abused its discretion. The Appellate Division judgment was reversed and the matter was remitted to that court for issuance of a new securing order complying with § 510.10.
Hannah Kon represented Mr. Guerra